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ABSTRACT 
                                          
 Scholars, practitioners and policymakers continue to debate what 
constitutes “good” corporate governance.  Academic efforts to evaluate the 
effect of governance provisions such as dual class voting structures, staggered 
boards of directors and separating the positions of CEO and Chairman of the 
Board, have produced inconsistent or inconclusive results.  The consequence is 
that the debate over corporate governance is increasingly political and 
discordant.  
 
 We offer a way to address this debate.  The rise of index-based investing 
provides a market-based alternative to governance regulation.  Through the 
creation of bespoke governance index funds, asset managers can offer investors 
the opportunity to choose an index that corresponds to their governance 
preferences.  We term this approach synthetic governance. At the same time, 
synthetic governance offers a new tool to collect evidence on the economic 
impact of corporate governance by providing a market-based tool for evaluating 
the relationship between corporate governance and stock returns. 
 
We illustrate the potential of synthetic governance with the creation of a new 
governance-based index, the Dual Index, which selects portfolio companies on 
the basis of a dual class voting structure.  We compare the performance of the 
Dual Index to various benchmarks and demonstrate the potential, through 
governance-based indexing, for investors to realize superior returns. We further 
modify the Dual Index by implementing synthetic sunsets to highlight the value 
creation of dual-class companies in their early years and provide evidence on 
the appropriate length of a time-based sunset provision. Finally, we expand our 
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University of California Berkeley, Haas School of Business; Steven Davidoff Solomon is 
Professor of Law at the University of California Berkeley, School of Law. We thank 
participants at workshops at [] for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
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analysis of synthetic governance with a second index – the Split Index – which 
tests the effect of separating the positions of CEO and Chairman of the Board.  
We  conclude that synthetic governance offers a meaningful way for investors 
and issuers to more economically adopt and invest in governance provisions. 
We thus provide a way out of the corporate current war over what exactly 
constitutes “good” governance.  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 War has broken out over public firm corporate governance.  In one corner, 
big institutional investors urge all companies to adopt “best practices” for 
corporate governance including one share/one vote, annual election of directors, 
independent board chairs, majority voting for director elections and a host of 
other similar provisions.1  In the other corner are the firms themselves, which 
advocate for firm-specific governance structures tailored to each firm’s 
idiosyncratic needs and characteristics.2 A high-profile example is the debate 
over dual (or multi) class stock.3  In recent years, a substantial percentage of big 
technology companies have gone public with dual and tri- class voting 
structures, decisions that have enraged the disenfranchised institutional 
investors.4 In turn, institutional investors have sought the support of regulators, 
exchanges and index providers in an effort to preclude the use of dual class.5  
The war has spread to new terrain recently as index providers have sided with 
 
1  See generally Jill Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of 
Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PENN. L. REV. 17 
(2019) (detailing the attempts of institutional investors to influence firm governance in these 
areas).  
2  See Martin Lipton, One Size Does Not Fit All, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate 
Governance, Oct. 16, 2019, available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/10/16/one-
size-does-not-fit-all/ (arguing that a new paper supports “the ringing truth of the oft heard 
‘one size doesn’t fit all’ criticism of the stylized corporate governance principles 
promulgated by organizations like Institutional Shareholder Services, Glass Lewis, Council 
of Institutional Investors and many major institutional investors.”) 
3 See Jill Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Problem of Sunsets, 99 B.U. LAW REV. 
1057, 1060 (2019) (describing controversy over dual class stock); Andrew Winden & 
Andrew Baker, Dual-Class Index Exclusion, 13 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 101, 104 (2019) 
(describing the debate over dual class as “[o]ne of the most contentious and long-standing 
debates in corporate governance”).  
4 Council of Institutional Inv’rs, Dual-Class IPO Snapshot: 2017-2018 Statistics,  
(2018), https://www.cii.org/files/2018Q3%20IPO%20Stats.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XBR-ML 
64] (noting that out of 124 IPOs in 2018, “23, or 19%, had dual class structures with 
unequal voting rights”). 
5  See Dual-Class Stock, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, https://www.cii.org/dualclass 
_stock [https://perma.cc/XRJ4-S6R5] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019) (“CII’s policies endorse 
the principle of ‘one share, one vote’: every share of a public company’s common stock 
should have equal voting rights.”). 
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the institutional investors, announcing changes to index inclusion requirements 
to exclude newly-listed dual and tri- class firms.6  
 
 The fundamental struggle between these capital markets actors is over the 
balance of power in today’s publicly-traded firm.  But it is also about something 
more directly relevant to investors – the economic value of corporate governance 
measures.  More specifically, the fight over dual-class stock and other 
governance provisions raises basic issues of how to determine whether corporate 
governance provisions create economic value. To date, empirical studies are 
mixed – some finding value in specific corporate provisions, others finding no 
or negative value.7 The takeaways from these studies are similarly mixed.  Some 
claim empirical support for pressuring firms to adopt best practices of corporate 
governance in the name of increasing firm value.8  Some challenge the one-size-
fits-all approach and argue that the economic impact of governance provisions 
varies according to the characteristics of individual firms.9  Still others are 
skeptical about the entire debate and posit that corporate governance is trivial.10 
 
 In light of the conflicting evidence with respect to some measures of corporate 
governance, much of the debate over corporate governance measures has 
become policy oriented – based on idiosyncratic preferences of capital markets 
actors and policymakers.  Thus, for example, provisions that increase the power 
of shareholders relative to managers are defended in terms of democratic 
principles and accountability.11  With this development, the policy approach to 
certain provisions has become even more fractured.  The debate over dual-class 
stock is again emblematic, as reflected, for example, in a former SEC 
 
6  Press Release, S&P Dow Jones Indices, S&P Dow Jones Indices Announces Decision 
on Multi-Class Shares and Voting Rules (July 31, 2017), https://www.spiceindices. 
com/idpfiles/spiceassets/resources/public/documents/561162_spdjimulticlasssharesandvotin
grulesannouncement7.31.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ATA-JJZF]. 
7  Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Alan Ferrell, What matters in corporate governance?, 
22(2) REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009) 
8  Martijn Cremers & Simone Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 
STAN. L. REV. 67, 105 (2016). 
9  See Yakov Amihud, Markus Schmid & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Settling the Staggered 
Board Debate, 166 U. PENN. L. REV. 1475 (2018) reprinted in 30 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 61 
(2018). 
10  See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis. 84 
NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 542 (1990). 
11 See, e.g., Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the Curious 
Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2079 (2010) (describing 
political theory ways of conceptualizing shareholder democracy in terms of  “a public 
choice approach and a civic republican approach”). See also Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the 
Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 57 (2008) (arguing that 
“shareholder democracy may enable shareholders to increase their advocacy on behalf of 
stakeholders”). 
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Commissioner’s statement that “asking investors to put eternal trust in corporate 
royalty is antithetical to our values as Americans.”12   
 
 Similarly, the absence in many cases of dispositive empirical evidence 
concerning economic value has led market participants, who may be wary of 
outright bans on controversial governance provisions, to advocate hybrid 
positions.  Thus, although the debate over dual-class stock was initially about 
whether it should be permitted at all, the battle has subsequently shifted to 
whether dual-class stock should have mandatory sunset provisions or be allowed 
to last in some measure of perpetuity.13   
 
 We find this debate over corporate governance puzzling.  While we 
acknowledge that the empirical evidence is in some cases mixed or non-
definitive, market participants have the ability to allocate their investments on 
the basis of corporate governance.  More specifically, if corporate governance 
provisions have economic value, one would expect a market to develop in 
mechanisms that facilitate investing on the basis of governance.  Investors 
should prefer to invest in companies which have better governance, and 
companies should respond to their desires by structuring governance to attract 
capital.14   
 
 We recognize, of course, that the economic reality may be cluttered by market 
imperfections.  These include the possibility that the IPO market may not price 
governance mechanisms properly15 as well as the risk that institutional investors 
may object to governance provisions for non-economic reasons or as the result 
of their internal agency costs.16  But still, one would expect that there would be 
some indicia of market forces at work on this issue.   
 
 
12  Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at Univ. Cal. 
Berkeley Sch. of Law: Perpetual Dual-Class Stock: The Case Against Corporate Royalty 
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/perpetual-dual-class-stock-case-
againstcorporate-royalty [https://perma.cc/2FXJ-UU9G].  Professor Jackson reports the 
results of his own empirical analysis of dual-class stock in the public version of his speech 
and finds that the benefits disappear a number of years post-IPO.  
13  See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 3. 
14 Perhaps the most prominent advocate of this view are Frank Easterbrook and Daniel 
Fischel.  Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel., THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 31 (1991) (“corporate governance devices that have survived in many 
firms for extended periods are particularly unlikely candidates for challenge as mistakes.”). 
15 See, e.g., Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? 
Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (2001) (arguing that the IPO 
market does not price governance terms accurately). 
16  Jay C. Hartzell, Jarl G. Kallberg & Crocker H. Liu, The Role of Corporate Governance in 
Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts, 51 J. L. & ECON. 539 
(2008).  
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 This article introduces an alternative to policy debates or academic empirical 
studies – a market-based mechanism for evaluating the relationship between 
corporate governance and economic value.  We argue that advances in the 
structure and scope of our capital markets now allow for investors to select into 
investment products that implement governance choices.  More specifically, we 
argue that investors can use index funds to structure their investment decisions 
based on their assessment as to which corporate governance structures which 
really can (and cannot) create economic value. 17   We term this approach 
synthetic governance. 
 
 In Part I of this article, we explore the debate over governance mechanisms.  
We then delineate what we see as the crux of this debate: a struggle over who 
exercises corporate decision-making power.  More specifically, we examine the 
incentives and roles of the various players in the corporate governance debate. 
We also analyze the tension between the one-size-fits-all governance rules 
advocated by institutional investors and the increasing use by most public firms 
of an idiosyncratic model. We conclude by examining the corporate governance 
provisions themselves and the empirical literature seeking to assess the 
relationship between corporate governance and economic value.  
 
 Part II focuses on a specific and highly-controversial governance mechanism 
– dual-class stock.  We describe the rise of dual-class stock, the push-back by 
institutional investors and the developing debate over sunset provisions.  We 
also note that dual class presents one of the most compelling illustrations of the 
conflict between theory and practice.  Although policymakers and academicians 
historically identified dual class as one of the most pernicious tools for limiting 
management accountability to shareholders, recent years have seen increasing 
use by new IPO companies of dual class structures. 18   We also identify 
regulatory and quasi-regulatory responses to the use of dual class, including 
solutions considered by governmental agencies, index fund providers and stock 
exchanges.   
 
 In Part III we introduce synthetic governance.  We first explain the role and 
growing importance of index investing in allocating investment dollars. 
Although index investing is commonly understood as a strategy for investing in 
 
17 Index funds do not make information-based trading decisions and instead hold securities 
based on their inclusion in a designated index.  See Fisch et al., supra note 1 at 19 
(describing index investing); Andrew W. Lo, What Is an Index?, 42 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 
21, 21-22 (2016) (explaining that the critical characteristics of an index are that it be 
“transparent, investable, and systematic”). We use the term index fund here to include both 
indexed mutual funds and exchange-traded-funds (ETFs).  ETFs are publicly traded on the 
secondary market rather than purchased from or sold to the fund sponsor.  Fisch, et al., 
supra note 1, at 19 n. 4.  The underlying index may be used by a broad range of mutual 
funds or a “bespoke” index created for a specific mutual fund sponsor.   
18  See supra note 5. 
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the broad market without regard to firm-specific characteristics such as 
governance, index investing can be used to implement any rules-based approach 
to investment selection and portfolio composition 19   As a result, index 
technology enables investors to select into or out of preferred governance 
mechanisms.  Although the large asset management firms do not currently 
appear to offer investors index funds that invest on the basis of governance 
provisions, such indexes could allow investors to exclude firms that incorporate 
value-decreasing governance provisions without sacrificing the low cost and 
diversification afforded by an index strategy.20   
 
 Notably, synthetic governance allows investors to make governance-based 
investment decisions on an efficient basis, without limiting the governance 
choices of individual firms.  For example, an investor may invest in a mutual 
fund based on an index of S&P 500 firms that excludes dual-class stocks.  Index 
fund strategies can also be tailored more precisely.  So, for example, rather than 
excluding all dual-class firms from its portfolio, a fund could disinvest from 
companies with dual-class stock if that the dual class does not sunset after a pre-
specified period of time, creating, in effect, a synthetic sunset.   
 
 We highlight three potential benefits to synthetic governance.  First, it 
provides a market-based mechanism to test the economic value of controversial 
governance provisions.  If critics of such governance provisions are correct, 
governance-based index funds should outperform their broad-based 
competitors.  Second, synthetic governance may lead to more efficient allocation 
of capital by drawing inflows into funds that properly evaluate the economic 
value of governance.  Third, synthetic governance provides a mechanism to 
enhance management accountability by providing passive investors a 
mechanism for subjecting the governance choices of their portfolio companies 
to capital market discipline. There are also systemic effects – if bespoke 
 
19 See Andrew W. Lo, What is an Index?, 42 J. PORT. MGMT. 21, 25 (2016) (explaining that 
an index must be transparent, investible and systematic, “meaning that the index’s 
construction must be rules-based and not dependent on any discretion or human 
judgment.”). One such rules-based approach is investing on the basis of environmental, 
social and governance (ESG) considerations.  ESG funds enable investors to engage in 
socially responsible investing, typically by excluding companies based on characteristics 
such as the manufacture of weapons or their reliance on fossil fuels.  Investment flows into 
ESG index funds and ETFs have grown substantially.  See, e.g., Mitch Goldberg, ESG index 
funds are hot. That may be a risky thing for investors, CNBC.COM, Nov. 17, 2019, 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/17/esg-index-funds-are-hot-that-may-be-a-risky-thing-for-
investors.html (describing growth of ESG index funds and identifying potential risks). 
20 Actively-managed funds can take governance factors into account, although the degree to 
which they do so is unclear, in part because actively-managed investment strategies are 
proprietary.   
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governance indexes are successful in attracting investor assets, firms may adopt 
specific governance practices to qualify for inclusion.21  
 
 In Part IV we provide a practical illustration of our theory of synthetic 
governance by constructing and examining a novel bespoke governance index, 
the Dual Index. The Dual Index responds to the debate over dual-class voting by 
creating and evaluating the performance of an index of dual-class companies.  
The Dual Index further provides a tool for implementing mandatory sunset 
provisions for dual class voting structures synthetically by dropping companies 
from the index if they fail to eliminate that dual-class structure after a pre-
specified number of years following their IPO.  In other words, the Dual Index 
imposes a synthetic sunset for dual-class companies.   
 
 We examine the performance of this Index over a period of time.  We find 
that over a back-testing period from June 2009 to December 2019 the Dual Index 
earned an annual return of 19.23% with standard deviation of 14.39%, while the 
market index earned an annual return of 14.98% with standard deviation of 
12.98%. The Dual Index performance corresponds to a monthly multi-factor 
alpha of 31 basis points. 22  . We modify the Dual Index by implementing 
synthetic sunsets to provide evidence on the appropriate length of a time-based 
sunset provision.  Our results highlight that value creation in the Dual Index 
occurs to a greater extent in the years after the firm’s IPO.  We also expand our 
analysis of synthetic governance with a second index – the Split Index – which 
tests the effect of separating the positions of CEO and Chairman of the Board.  
We find that the Split Index outperforms the market as well, further supporting 
our thesis that synthetic governance can be used to generate excess returns.  .  
 
 Our case study highlights that the choice between private ordering and public 
intervention has historically been artificially constrained.  The new technology 
of ETFs and indexes allows investors to create their own bespoke indexes which 
reflect their governance preferences.  Moreover, these investment choices 
highlight the economic value of governance as it fits within each investor’s lens, 
further focusing the capital markets.  Our example of the Dual Index illustrates 
the wider potential value of bespoke portfolios to enable investors to incorporate 
governance attributes systematically into their investment decisions.  
Ultimately, synthetic governance offers a new mechanism to mediate the 
ongoing struggles between institutional investors and publicly traded firms over 
the appropriate mechanisms for corporate governance and enables a market-
based resolution of the corporate governance wars.  
 
 
21 We use the term “bespoke index” to denote an index that uses a specialized investment 
strategy.  See Adriana Z. Robertson, Passive in Name Only: Delegated Management and 
‘Index’ Investing, 36 YALE J. REG. 795, 821 (2019) (explaining the concept of a bespoke 
index).  
22 See infra notes []-[] and accompanying text.  
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I. The Debate over Corporate Governance 
 
Corporate governance is generally understood as the provisions within a 
corporation that enhance management accountability to shareholders and reduce 
the potential for managerial agency costs.23  Corporate governance (as opposed 
to corporate law) focuses on the internal structures of the corporation and on 
firm-specific choices among legally permissible structures. 24   Common 
elements of corporate governance include the size and composition of the board 
of directors, shareholder rights and the balance of power between shareholders 
and directors, and, in some jurisdictions, the role of non-shareholder 
stakeholders. 25   A variety of specific provisions fall within this general 
framework such as the proportion of independent directors on the board, whether 
the board is classified or subject to election annually, and the ability of 
shareholders to influence board composition and corporate operations through 
tools such as the power to nominate director candidates, call special meetings 
and act outside a meeting through written consents.26 
 
A. Corporate Governance Theory 
 
The general theoretical foundation of U.S. corporate governance arises from 
the fundamental agency problem resulting from the separation of ownership and 
control in the corporation.27   The directors and officers who have primary 
authority over operational decisions are not owners and instead run the 
corporation on the shareholders’ behalf.  Governance mechanisms are designed 
to reduce rent-seeking and opportunism and to ensure alignment between the 
 
23 See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 
737, 740-41 (1997) (explaining that corporate governance seeks to answer the question: 
“How can financiers be sure that, once they sink their funds [into a firm], they get anything 
but a worthless piece of paper back from the manager?”); Edward C. Rock, America's 
Shifting Fascination with Comparative Corporate Governance, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 367, 389 
(1996) (describing corporate governance as “the question of how we can make managers 
sufficiently accountable so that they will manage the corporation for the shareholders”). 
24 See generally Brian R. Cheffins, The History of Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 46, 47 (Mike Wright, Donald S. Siegel, Kevin 
Keasey & Igor Filatotchev eds., 2013) (detailing the evolution and usage of the term 
corporate governance). 
25 For a broad discussion of corporate governance principles and an effort to “identify the 
key building blocks for a sound corporate governance framework,” see OECD, G20/OECD 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 7 (2015), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264236882-en  
26 Id. (discussing these issues and their usage).  
27 See, e.g., Jesse Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE 
L.J. 1554, 1624 (2015) (“[S]hareholders' ability to minimize managerial agency costs is one 
of the most important challenges in the corporate governance of widely held firms”).   
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directors and officers as agents and the shareholders as principals.28  Governance 
also plays a role in reducing systemic risk and engendering better, more reasoned 
decision-making.  The initial concept of corporate governance emerged as a tool 
to limit managerial power,29 and, the managerial agency problem continues to 
predominate as the theoretic “driver” of corporate governance.30 
 
Within that literature, the question of what constitutes “good corporate 
governance” is, itself, polarized into two competing camps.31  Advocates of 
shareholder democracy support governance mechanisms that increase 
managerial accountability 32  and characterize mechanisms that insulate 
management from shareholder interference as entrenchment.33  Toward that 
same end, institutional investors, proxy advisory firms, and other participants in 
corporate governance debates have developed guidelines of corporate 
governance practices that emphasize shareholder power.34 
 
28 See Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware and the Transformation of Corporation Governance, 40 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2015) (discussing these and other accepted features of corporate 
governance as well as their evolving usage).  
29 See, e.g., Dorothy Lund & Elizabeth Pollman, The Corporate Governance Machine 
(working paper dated 2020) (describing the birth of the corporate governance concept). 
30 See Michael Jensen & William Menkling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 357 (1976) (theorizing that 
controlling agency costs is central to the economics of the firm).  We note that corporations 
with concentrated rather than dispersed ownership are the norm in many non-U.S. 
jurisdictions.  Large shareholders can typically exercise sufficient control to mitigate 
managerial agency costs but the ability of these shareholders to generate private benefits of 
control presents an alternative agency problem.  See Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of 
Shareholder Influence: Managerial Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative 
Corporate Governance, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129 130-31 (2009) (distinguishing the 
managerial agency problems of the U.S. and U.K. systems from the risk of shareholder self-
dealing in Continental European systems characterized by concentrated ownership).   
31 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch & Simone Sepe, Shareholder Collaboration, __ TEX. L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming 2020) (describing the management-power model and the shareholder-power 
model).  There are other views of corporate governance.  The most prominent of the 
alternative view is that of team production put forth by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout.  
Team production theorizes that the corporation should be managed “to maximize the joint 
welfare of all the firm's stakeholders - including shareholders, managers, employees, and 
possibly other groups such as creditors or the local community - who contribute firm-
specific resources to corporate production.” Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VIRGINIA L. REV. 248, 248 (1999). 
32 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973 (2002) (arguing for shareholder primacy in corporate takeover 
decisions) and Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440-41 (2001) (setting forth the “standard shareholder-oriented” 
regime as the accepted norm). 
33 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful 
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 
887, 889 (2002). 
34 Council of Institutional Investors, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICIES, Sept. 15, 2017,  
https://www.cii.org/files/policies/09_15_17_corp_gov_policies.pdf.  
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Others take a countervailing view that governance should promote broad 
managerial authority to set corporate policy and goals. 35   In this scenario, 
governance mechanisms do not empower shareholders but focus instead on 
limiting managerial conflicts of interest and opportunism.36  Supporters of this 
approach tout the advantages to board and managerial discretion and emphasize 
the potential problems with shareholder empowerment including limited 
expertise and the risk of shareholder opportunism.37   
 
We note that although traditionally corporate governance has focused on 
enhancing managerial accountability to shareholders,38 recently, a debate has 
arisen over stakeholder governance – the extent to which corporate governance 
can or should be used to address non-shareholder, stakeholder interests.39  This 
debate has found traction in arguments that corporations should adopt or modify 
their purpose to focus on delivering value for all stakeholders rather than only 
shareholders.40  We do not take a view here on this debate, but instead position 
ourselves within the literature that evaluates the effect of corporate governance 
on shareholder value.41   
 
35 Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 
733,744-46 (2007). 
36 See Amir N. Licht, The Maximands Of Corporate Governance: A Theory Of Values And 
Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 649, 657 (2004) (arguing that global corporate 
governance today “is narrowly construed as a call for improving public/minority 
shareholder protection from the opportunism of managers and controlling shareholders.”) 
37 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 547, 605 (2003) (asserting that “the board of directors is not 
a mere agent of the shareholders, but rather is a sort of Platonic guardian serving as the 
nexus of the various contracts making up the corporation.”); Leo E. Strine Jr., Can We Do 
Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological 
Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 455 (2014) (describing the view 
of some commentators that “the best way to ensure that corporations generate wealth for 
diversified stockholders is to give the managers of corporations a strong hand to take risks 
and implement business strategies without constant disruption by shifting stock market 
sentiment.”). 
38 See Lund & Pollman, supra note 29 (explaining that “shareholder primacy became 
ingrained in the very notion of ‘mainstream’ corporate governance”). 
39 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder 
Governance, __ CORNELL L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2020) (describing and critically 
assessing stakeholder governance). 
40 See, e.g., Business Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation (Aug. 19, 
2019), https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/BRT-
Statement-on-the-Purpose-of-a-Corporation-with-Signatures.pdf. For a critical analysis of 
this perspective, see Jill Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Corporations Have a 
Purpose? (forthcoming 2021). 
41 We note that the metrics for evaluating corporate decisionmaking in terms of the interests 
of non-shareholder stakeholders continue to evolve.  See, e.g. Connor Doyle, Performance 
Metrics: Accelerating the Stakeholder Model, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
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B. Corporate Governance Empirical Support 
 
Although much of the debate over appropriate corporate governance is 
theoretical, the economic impact of corporate governance is capable of empirical 
measurement.  In this regard legal and academic scholars have attempted to 
evaluate, through empirical methodologies, the impact of various governance 
mechanisms both on overall economic performance42 and on a variety of more 
specific issues such as a firm’s investment in research and development,43 the 
likelihood that the firm will be subject to a government enforcement action, and 
the relationship between good corporate governance and the likelihood that a 
firm will be involved in financial fraud or other misconduct.44    
 
Similarly, studies have sought both to measure overall governance quality and 
to analyze the effect of governance quality on firm performance.  The two best 
known studies that attempt to construct a measure of the quality of firm 
governance are by Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, who created the GIM index,45 and 
by Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, who constructed the E-index.46   The GIM index 
uses 24 governance provisions relating to “construct a “Governance Index” as a 
proxy for the balance of power between shareholders and managers.  GIM then 
compare companies that score well on this index in terms of shareholder rights 
(which they term the Democracy Portfolio) against companies that score poorly 
(the Dictatorship Portfolio) and find that that Democracy Portfolio outperformed 
by 8.5 percent per year.47  As one commentator explains “GIM's dictatorship-
 
FIN. REG., Nov. 29, 2019, https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/11/29/performance-metrics-
accelerating-the-stakeholder-model/  (describing uptick in the number of companies 
including non-financial metrics in their evaluation of executive performance). 
42 See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board 
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 231 (2002) 
(attempting to evaluate the effect of board independence on firm financial performance); 
Ryan Krause, Matthew Semandeni, & Albert A. Cannella, Jr., CEO Duality: A Review and 
Research Agenda, 40 J. MGMT. 256 (2014) (empirically analyzing the effect of separating 
the positions of CEO and chairman of the board). 
43 See, e.g., Diego Asensio-López, Laura Cabeza-García, & Nuria González-Álvarez, 
Corporate governance and innovation: a theoretical review, 28 EUR. J. MGMT. & BUS. 
ECON. 266 (2019) (reviewing empirical literature analyzing the relationship between 
corporate governance and innovation). 
44 Mark S. Beasley, An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director 
Composition and Financial Statement Fraud, 71 ACCT’G REV. 443 (1996); Patricia M. 
Dechow & Douglas J. Skinner, Earnings Management: Reconciling the Views of 
Accounting Academics, Practitioners, and Regulators, 14 ACCOUNTING HORIZONS 
235(2000). 
45 Paul Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick., Corporate Governance and Equity 
Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 111, 129 (2003). 
46 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell., What Matters in Corporate 
Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2004).  
47 Gompers et al., supra note 45, at 109. 
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democracy portfolio emerged as the standard metric in recent times for 
examining the share price impact of good governance”48 
 
Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell subsequently developed a variation on the GIM 
index, which they termed the E- (entrenchment) index that contained the six 
components from the GIM index that, in their view, were most highly associated 
with managerial entrenchment.  BCF found that increases in the E index were 
negatively correlated with Tobin’s Q. 49   The BCF index has been highly 
“influential in shaping how scholars and policymakers evaluate the relative 
merits of various corporate governance regimes,”50  Although scholars have 
questioned both the methodology and the results of these studies,51 together the 
GIM and E-index have spawned a variety of empirical and policy papers arguing 
that good governance is an important driver of firm economic value.52   
 
C. The Uncertain Effect of Corporate Governance 
 
Despite these two widely-utilized indexes and thousands of other studies 
examining corporate governance, there is limited consensus on the desirability 
of many corporate governance provisions.53  There are two significant reasons 
 
48 Laura Kabler, Money in the Game: Executing a Governance-Based Hedge Fund Strategy, 
12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 146 (2006). 
49 Bebchuk, supra note 46, at 784-85.  Tobin’s Q has been described as "a standard measure 
used by financial economists, as a proxy for firm value."  Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for 
Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 900 n.150 (2005). 
50 Robert Bartlett & Frank Partnoy, The Misuse of Tobin's q, 73 VAND. L. REV. 353, 407 
(2020).   
51 Professors Bartlett and Partnoy have highlighted the issues of use of Tobin’s q for 
valuation purposes and its lack of fit in certain circumstances as utilized in the E-Index.  Id. 
at 405-411. Professor Larcker and others have questioned the validity of the underlying data 
in the index.  David F. Larcker, Peter C. Reiss, & Youfei Xiao., Corporate Governance 
Data and Measures Revisited (November 1, 2015); available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2694802 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2694802. The indexes 
have also been criticized on their endogeneity and omitted variable bias as well as the fact 
that the components are not generally related to measures which would affect firm value.  
Michael D. Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STANFORD L. 
REV.  1325 (2013).  See also Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Corporate governance and firm 
performance, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 257 (2008). 
52 See, e.g., Martijn Cremers & Allen Ferrell, Thirty Years of Shareholder Rights and Firm 
Value, 69 J. FIN. 1167 (2014) (extending the E-Index to an earlier time period); Lawrence D. 
Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation, 25 J. ACCT. & 
PUB. POL'Y 409, 428-29 (2006) (building an alternative index which is also found to 
correlate with firm performance). 
53 See Matt Cain, Jill Fisch, Sean Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, How Corporate 
Governance is Made:  The Case of the Golden Leash, 164 U. PENN. L. REV. 649, 657 (2016) 
(“Corporate governance research has therefore focused on the empirical question of whether 
and how particular governance terms are priced as a necessary first step in answering 
whether particular governance provisions are good or bad. Unfortunately, whether and how 
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for this.  One is the challenge of establishing causation.  Although many studies 
purport to demonstrate a correlation between governance metrics and economic 
performance, evidence on causality remains limited.  As one commentator 
explains, “[e]ven those who have written extensively on the correlation of 
governance, generally or with respect to specific governance factors, with 
company performance have largely rejected the existence of a causal 
connection.”54  More specifically, many studies of corporate governance suffer 
from an endogeneity problem.  They cannot separate out whether governance is 
causing a value increase in the firm or the governance is a proxy for other 
characteristics which enhance firm value.55  In other words – it may simply be 
the case that well-managed firms have good corporate governance, and that 
poorly-managed firms do not. 
 
A second question is the extent to which the effect of a given governance 
provision is firm-specific.  A substantial percentage of corporate governance 
studies examine the effect of a particular corporate governance provision across 
all firms, implicitly assuming that the effect of that provision will be the same 
for the entire market. 56   Yet this assumption is problematic.  Firms differ 
substantially along various dimensions, and there are reasons to believe that the 
effect of specific governance terms may be heterogenous as well.  Thus, for 
example, Martijn Cremer and Simone Sepe found that, when they differentiated 
among firms, the effect of a classified board was positive for some firms and 
negative for others.57  Amihud, Schmidt and Solomon take this approach even 
further and find that the staggered board on average has no effect on firm value 
and any measurement is also idiosyncratic.58  If the effect of a governance 
provision differs among firms, then a one-size-fits-all approach, based on 
distinguishing good governance provisions from bad ones, is likely to be 
 
the market prices corporate governance remains subject to dispute, as a review of the recent 
literature shows.”) 
54 Kabler, supra note 48, at 122. 
55 See Amihud, et al., supra note 9, at  1501-1505  (highlighting this issue in the context of 
valuing the adoption or removal of staggered board provisions). 
56 See inter-alia Bebchuk, supra note 46; Gompers et al., supra note 45. 
57 See K.J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P.Litov & Simone M. Sepe, Staggered boards and 
long-term firm value, revisited, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 422, 424 (2017) (“Our results suggest that 
the role of staggered boards differs across firms in a way that both economic channels could 
play a role.”) 
58 See Amihud et al., supra note 9. 
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misguided. 59  And even if it is not misguided, it speaks against mandating 
uniform governance rules across companies.60   
 
Thus, in assessing the right governance provisions for a firm, there is still 
substantial theoretical and empirical uncertainty over governance as a whole and 
many of the specific provisions that people argue are indicative of “good 
governance”.  Because of this uncertainty, although there is, in principle, 
widespread support for good governance, the question of what constitutes good 
governance remains highly contested.61  Even governance practices that have 
such broad-based support that they are embedded in regulatory requirements, 
such as requiring a majority of independent directors on corporate boards, lack 
strong empirical evidence tying them to firm economic value.62  Commentators 
and practitioners continue to debate the merits of other governance provisions 
such as staggered boards, dual class shares, and the separation of chairman from 
CEO.63  The net result was aptly summed up by Dorothy Lund who observed 
that “without a consensus about what constitutes good governance, there is 
reason to believe that the proliferation of an unthinking, one-size-fits-all 
approach to governance will make many companies worse off.”64 
 
II.  Dual Class and Sunsets 
 
A. Dual Class Voting Structures 
 
The battle over corporate governance and particular governance structures 
and provision is perhaps best illustrated by the heated dispute over dual or multi-
class voting structures.  In a company with dual class stock, all the shares of 
common stock have equal economic rights, but some shares, termed high-vote 
shares, have more voting rights than the others, which are termed low-vote 
 
59 See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware 
Corporate Law and Governance from 1992–2004? A Retrospective on Some Key 
Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1412–13 (2005) (“Life in the boardroom is not 
black and white; directors and officers make decisions in shades of gray all the time. A 
“clear” law, in the sense of one that is codified, is simply not realistic....  There can be no 
viable corporate governance regime that is founded on a “one size fits all” notion.”) 
60 See, e.g., Amihud et al., supra note 9  (arguing that empirical findings mitigate that the 
staggered board is idiosyncratic benefitting some companies and harming others),   
61 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 49 at 833 (“[w]ith respect to many issues in corporate law, 
deciding which arrangement is optimal is highly contestable”). 
62 See Bhagat & Black, supra note 42. 
63 See Klausner, supra note 51; Cain et al., supra note 53.   
64 Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 
493, 495 (2018). 
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shares.65  The typical ratio is 10 votes to one66 although in the extreme case, 
exemplified by Snap, the shares sold to public shareholders have no voting rights 
at all.67  Typically founders, and sometimes other early stage investors, hold 
high-vote shares, while low-vote shares are sold to public investors.68  Dual class 
stock thus enables a founder to retain control while holding an investment that 
reflects less than a majority of the firm’s economic value.69  In some cases the 
divergence can be stark with the founder or other controllers maintaining control 
of the company with 10% or less of the economic value.70    
 
Dual class voting structures have existed for decades.  Ford Motor Company 
used a dual class structure in its 1956 IPO to maintain control of the company 
with the Ford family.71 Historically, a limited number of firms used dual class 
voting, and those firms tended to be media companies, family businesses and 
insider-controlled businesses.72  For example, the New York Times has a dual 
 
65 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 3, at 1064 (“Dual class stock refers to a capital structure 
in which shares of an issuer's common stock with equal economic rights differ with respect 
to their relative voting power. The common stock in a dual class company is divided into 
two or more classes, in which the shares with more voting power are typically described as 
high vote stock, and the shares with less voting power are described as low vote stock.”) 
66 See Dual-Class Stock, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV'RS, 
https://www.cii.org/dualclass_stock [https://perma.cc/XRJ4-S6R5] (last visited Apr. 10, 
2019) (“The ratio most frequently employed is 10 votes per superior share to one vote per 
inferior share.”). 
67 See Eleanor Bloxham, Snap Shouldn't Have Been Allowed to Go Public Without Voting 
Rights, FORTUNE (Mar. 3, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/03/snap-ipo-non-voting-stock/ 
(explaining that, “[a]t Snap (SNAP), only pre-IPO investors who own private shares will be 
able to vote on company matters”). 
68 See Ken Bertsch, Council of Institutional Inv'rs, Snap and the Rise of No-Vote Common 
Shares, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 26, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/26/snap-and-the-rise-of-no-vote-common-shares/ 
[https://perma.cc/P6Q4-QKTJ] (“With NYSE-listed Snap's arrival with ‘zero’ rights for 
public shareholders, perhaps the bottom has been reached.”); Eric Jhonsa, Zillow Plans To 
Issue Non-Voting Class C Shares, SEEKING ALPHA (July 21, 2015, 9:54 PM), 
https://seekingalpha.com/news/2643935-zillow-plans-to-issue-non-voting-class-c-shares 
[https://perma.cc/W9E5-N82F] (reporting that Zillow created “Class C shares that carry no 
voting rights”); Floyd Norris, The Many Classes of Google Stock, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX 
(Apr. 2, 2014, 6:03 PM), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/the-many-classes-
of-google-stock/ [https://perma.cc/5PTX-TEU6] (describing issuance of Class C shares in 
Google that have no voting rights). 
69 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 3, at 1065. 
70 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class 
Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585, 631 (2017). 
71 See JOSEPH A. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 166-77 (1958) (detailing the 
background to the IPO of Ford Motor Company and its use of dual-class stock). 
72 David J. Berger, Are Dual-Class Companies Harmful to Stockholders? A Preliminary 
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class structure.73  The justification for dual class was that it permitted a founding 
family or other controller to maintain a unique business, such as a newspaper 
operation, which needed to be isolated from market forces or otherwise run in 
the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders.  While dual class stock may 
assist firms in meeting these other stakeholder interests, studies suggest that dual 
class structures at these firms were also associated with higher agency costs, 
limited minority shareholder rights and inferior economic performance.74   
 
Starting with the Google IPO in 2004, however, the use of dual class voting 
structures shifted – both increasing in popularity and migrating to the technology 
sector.75  A substantial number of technology firms began to go public with dual 
class structures and, in recent years, approximately 19% of U.S. technology 
companies have gone public with a dual class structure.76  Although historically 
dual class companies have comprised less than 2% of the major stock market 
indices, they represent roughly 9% by market capitalization.77  And with the rise 
of dual class in technology firms, firms in other industries have felt more willing 
to adopt dual class voting structures. For example, Shake Shack which sells 
hamburgers has gone public as has Chewy which sells pet goods on-line.78  
 
The spread of dual class structures beyond a small group of media and family-
founded companies created wide-spread shareholder protest.  Shareholders have 
protested dual class on many grounds.  First, they complained about the 
disenfranchisement and the lack of an appropriate voice in the corporate 
 
(explaining that, although “Dual class companies have existed for nearly a century . . . most 
dual-class companies were family businesses, media companies seeking to ensure their 
publications could maintain journalistic editorial independence, or other companies led by a 
strong group of insiders”). 
73 N.Y. Times Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 22, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/71691/000007169117000003/a2016form10-
k_q4project.htm. 
74 See, e.g., Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis 
of Dual-Class Shares in the United States, 23 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 1051-1087 (2010). See 
also Ronald Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies, 
64 J. FIN.1697 (2009). 
75 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 3, at 1067-70 (detailing the resurgence of dual class 
stock in technology companies post-Google IPO). 
76 See Council Of Institutional Inv'rs, Dual-Class Ipo Snapshot: 2017-2018 Statistics, at 1 
(2018), https://www.cii.org/files/2018Q3%20IPO%20Stats.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XBR-
ML64] (noting that out of 124 IPOs, “23, or 19%, had dual class structures with unequal 
voting rights”). 
77 [cite] 
78 See Jeff Green & Carol Hymowitz, Let Them Eat Burgers, BloombergBusinessWeek. 
Feb. 6, 2015, available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-05/shake-
shack-ipo-soars-shareholder-democracy-be-damned; Kevin Curran, Chewy's Dual-Class 
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enterprise.79  Because dual class stock provides control to one or a small group 
of individuals, ordinary shareholders are unable to elect directors or if things go 
awry remove directors.  Second, the structure of dual class stock creates a 
potential gap between a controller’s economic interest and his or her voting 
interest, a gap that Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel have termed the “wedge.”80  
This gap creates increased incentives for self-dealing by the controller.81 The 
theoretical potential for self-dealing finds some real world support.  Viacom, for 
example, was notorious for continuing to pay its controller Sumner Redstone 
tens of millions of dollars each year despite his incapacitation.82   
 
There are other concerns.  As a practical matter, dual class is also one of the 
most powerful antitakeover devices,83 which has the effect of insulating dual 
class companies from the discipline of the takeover market.84 Relatedly, dual 
class stock also insulates management from activist shareholders who might 
agitate for change at the company.85 Commentators have also raised the idea that 
it is unfair or undemocratic for some shareholders to have disproportionate 
voting rights.86  And ultimately, dual class can vest perpetual control in the 
hands of one person long after that control is appropriate.87   
 
The criticism of dual class structures has grown more strident with the rise of 
institutional investors and particularly the big three, Blackrock, Vanguard and 
 
79 See Dual-Class Stock, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV'RS, 
https://www.cii.org/dualclass_stock [https://perma.cc/XRJ4-S6R5] (last visited Apr. 10, 
2019) (“CII's policies endorse the principle of ‘one share, one vote’: every share of a public 
company's common stock should have equal voting rights.”). 
80 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers, 107 
GEO. L.J. 1453, 1461 (2019) (defining the wedge as “the gap between the controller's 
fraction of voting rights and fraction of equity capital”). 
81 See id. at 1468-70 (modeling increased potential for self-dealing as the size of the wedge 
increases). 
82 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 70, at 587-88 (discussing that ninety-three year old 
Redstone refused to give up control despite “profound physical and mental illness”). 
83 Gompers et al., supra note 74 at 1052 (defining dual-class stock as the most extreme 
example of antitakeover protection). 
84 See, e.g., Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? 
Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 116-17 (2001), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=187348 ("The most restrictive [antitakeover protection] is either 
dual-class or a staggered board combined with prohibitions on voting by written consent and 
prohibitions on shareholders calling a special meeting”). 
85 See Kobi Kastiel, Against All Odds: Hedge Fund Activism In Controlled Companies, 
2016 COLUMBIA BUS. LAW. REV.  
86 See, e.g., Kara M. Stein., Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Stanford 
University: Mutualism: Reimagining the Role of Shareholders in Modern Corporate 
Governance (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-stein-
021318#_ednref45 (stating that dual class structures are “inherently undemocratic, 
disconnecting the interests of a company’s controlling shareholders from its other 
shareholders.”). 
87 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 70. 
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State Street.  The top 10 Institutional investors now control greater than 50% of 
most S&P 500 companies, and the Big Three alone often control 10-25%.88  This 
permits a small group of institutional investors to exercise vast power in 
corporate America.  Dual class stock tempers the power of these sizable 
stockholdings, shifting it back to the founder and frustrating the principle of one 
share/one vote.   
 
Although concerns about dual class voting structures led a number of stock 
exchanges around the world to limit their use, most exchanges eliminated these 
restrictions in order to compete for listings of companies with dual class 
structures.89  Many institutional investors have criticized these changes and 
supported petitions urging the stock exchanges to adopt or reinstate listing limits 
on companies with dual class structures. 90   The Council of Institutional 
Investors, for example, explains that “the "one share, one vote" principle has 
been a core focus for CII since its founding in the 1980s”91 and has actively 
campaigned against dual class structures.92  Efforts by institutional investors 
also prompted several major index providers to restrict the inclusion of some 
new dual class firms in 2018.93  Because inclusion in popular indexes often leads 
to greater liquidity and lower costs of capital for issuers, the theory of this effort 
was to create an incentive for issuers to eliminate dual class stock so they could 
be included in the indexes.  Relatedly, the proxy advisory services who advise 
these institutional shareholders, such as Institutional Shareholder Services 
(“ISS”), have also opposed dual class structures.  ISS has stated that these 
 
88 See Lucian Bebchuk* & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV. 721, 
735 (2019) (“as of 2017 the Big Three held an average combined stake exceeding 20% of 
S&P 500 companies and 16.5% of Russell 3000 companies.”). 
89 See Dual-Class Stock Structure and Firm Innovation, 25 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 40, 48-49 
(2020) (describing efforts by the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange 
and NASDAQ to impose limitations or conditions on companies seeking to list with dual 
class stock); Flora Xiao Huang, Dual Class Shares Around the Top Global Financial 
Centres, 2 J. BUS. L. 137, 146-48 (2017) (describing Hong Kong and Singapore’s 
prohibition on dual class listings).  Both jurisdictions removed these prohibitions in 2018.  
Benjamin Robertson, Hong Kong Adds Dual-Class Shares, Paving Way for Tech Titans, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-24/hong-
kong-approves-dual-class-shares-paving-way-for-tech-titans; Singapore Details Rules for 




fight-against-dual-class-shares (describing CII’s petitions to the NYSE and NASDAQ, 
which was supported by BlackRock and T Rowe Price).  The SEC attempted to prohibit the 
NYSE from amending its listing requirements to permit dual class companies, but its effort 
was invalidated by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.  The Business Roundtable v. SEC, 
905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
91 Dual-Class Stock, supra note 5. 
92 Id.  
93 Fisch & Solomon, supra note 3, at 1076. 
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structures “are more likely to exhibit more problematic corporate governance 
practices.”94   
 
Despite these attacks, a number of companies have held fast in their support 
of dual class stock.  The primary rationale for dual class is that it provides a 
firm’s founder with the space to implement a long-term vision for the firm while 
insulated from short-term market pressure.95  This view is buttressed by the fact 
that dual class stock is increasingly utilized by technological companies that 
have been built by founders.  The issuance of dual class thus ensures that the 
founder can continue to pilot the firm successfully, often in an innovative area 
without outside interference.  As Google founders Sergey Brin and Larry Paige 
explained, Google’s dual class structure “will make it harder for outside parties 
to take over or influence Google [and] make it easier for our management team 
to follow the long term, innovative approach.”96   
 
B. Dual Class and Sunsets 
 
The debate over dual class stock has resulted in impasse.  To be sure the index 
providers have taken some steps of limiting these structures, but neither the stock 
exchanges nor the U.S. government appear willing to step in to prohibit dual 
class.  In the absence of regulation, issuers continue to IPO with dual class voting 
structures.97   
 
As a result of this continued growth of dual class, a second debate has arisen 
over the duration of a dual class voting structure.  More specifically, a number 
of commentators argue that, if a company decides to go public with a dual class 
voting structure, that structure should have a “sunset,” meaning that it terminates 
automatically, typically a designated number of years after the IPO. 98  The 
 
94 Kosmas Papadopoulos, ISS Discusses Dual-Class Shares: Governance Risks and 
Company Performance, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG, Jul. 1, 2019, available at 
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/07/01/iss-discusses-dual-class-shares-governance-
risks-and-company-performance/ 
95 See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 
125 YALE L.J. 560, 590 (2016). 
96 Google Inc., Registration Statement (Amend. No. 9 to Form S-1), at 29-30 (Aug. 18, 
2004). 
97 Warner Music Group for example recently went public raising $1.925 billion utilizing 
dual class stock with the high-vote stock having 20 votes per share. See Warner Music 
Group Registration Statement on Form S-1, dated May 26, 2020, at 15, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1319161/000119312520150678/d833365ds1a.htm
#rom833365_14 (“Upon completion of this offering, we will have two classes of voting 
common stock, Class A common stock and Class B common stock. Each share of Class A 
common stock is entitled to one vote per share and each share of Class B common stock is 
entitled to 20 votes per share.”)  See also supra note [] and accompanying text (noting that, 
in 2019, 19% of IPO companies went public with dual class voting structures). 
98 See, e.g., Andrew William Winden, Sunrise, Sunset: An Empirical and Theoretical 
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justification sunset provisions rests on the argument that, even if dual class 
provides valuable insulation to founders of newly-public companies, that 
insulation is most advantageous for early stage firms and likely dissipates over 
time.  Over time, then, the benefits of the dual class structure decline to the point 
where they are outweighed by the associated agency costs of dual class.  
 
This and other arguments, including empirical work, has led to calls that dual 
class firms adopt sunsets provisions.  SEC Commissioner Rob Jackson 
thoughtfully addressed this issue asserting that dual class is “corporate 
royalty.”99  SEC Investor Advocate Rick Fleming has termed dual-class shares 
“a recipe for disaster,” and urged the stock exchanges to require the sunsetting 
of super-voting rights.100  To date though, no governmental regulation appears 
to be imminent.   
 
And not surprisingly, there have been counter-arguments.  Two of the co-
authors of this paper have questioned the value of time-based sunsets in 
particular as a response to the dual class controversy in an article entitled The 
Problem of Sunsets.101 As we explained, to the extent that dual class stock 
provides value, time-based sunsets function as an arbitrary ex ante determination 
of how long that value is likely to persist.  Sunsets vary in length from three to 
twenty years. 102   As we observed in our article the applicable time period 
associated with existing time-based sunsets appears arbitrary.103  
 
In The Problem of Sunsets, we highlighted the potential to refine dual class 
voting structures with more nuanced sunset provisions in which the termination 
of dual class voting was tied to factors such as the transfer of high vote shares, 
the founder’s continued role in the business and size of the gap between founder 
voting control and ownership. Although time-based sunsets have been the 
primary focus of institutional investors and commentators, a small number of 
firms employ what we termed event-based sunsets.  In some firms, the dual 
 
Assessment of Dual-Class Stock Structures, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 852, 870 (describing 
time-based sunsets as “presumably what most institutional investors and proxy advisors are 
referring to when they insist that dual-class companies must adopt reasonable sunset 
provisions”). 
99 See Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at Univ. Cal. 
Berkeley Sch. of Law: Perpetual Dual-Class Stock: The Case Against Corporate Royalty 
(Feb. 15, 2018), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/perpetual-dual-class-stock-
case-againstcorporate-royalty [https://perma.cc/2FXJ-UU9G].  
100 Rick Fleming, SEC Investor Advocate, Dual-Class Shares: A Recipe for Disaster, Oct. 
15, 2019, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/fleming-dual-class-shares-recipe-
disaster#_edn8 
101 Fisch & Solomon, supra note 3. 
102 Id. at 1080. 
103 Id. at 1081 (“More problematic than the variation is the fact that the length of the sunset 
period appears to be arbitrary and does not seem to correlate with any theory about the 
length of time necessary for a founder to implement his or her vision.”) 
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voting structure terminates if the founder’s ownership level drops below a 
certain threshold.104  Others terminate if the controller dies or transfers their 
shares.105  A small subset provides for termination upon the incapacity of the 
controller.106  
 
C.  Empirical Support for Dual Class 
 
The debate over dual class thus mimics the debate over other governance 
mechanisms.  Commentators disagree on the theoretical question of whether 
dual class is value-enhancing and, if so, under what circumstances.  As with 
other corporate governance measures, there is also empirical uncertainty.  More 
specifically, the challenge with dual class voting structures is that the empirical 
evidence on their economic impact is mixed.   
 
A number of studies have shown that dual class stock enhances agency costs 
and reduces lower returns.107  The challenge is that these were studies of older 
dual class firms such as the media companies described above.108  Newer studies 
that focus on technology firms have found that, at least in some cases, dual class 
firms outperform firms with one share/one vote structures.109   Studies also 
provide support for the proposition that the economic value of dual class 
evaporates over time, although these studies document confounding factors such 
as a decline in the economic stake and involvement of the founder.110  These 
findings reinforce the notion that dual class allows a founder to focus on the long 
term, but that this performance dissipates as the founder sells his or her stake or 
reduces efforts to develop the business.  
 
These studies too are also limited by endogeneity and selection effects.  An 
issuer’s decision to go public with a dual class voting structure may reflect its 
superior performance which leads shareholders to be willing to invest 
 
104 Id. at 1086-88.  
105 Id. at 1089-91. 
106 Id. at 1091.  Andrew Winden has the leading article documenting the extent and use of 
sunset provisions.  Winden, supra note 98.Our conclusions in The Problem of Sunsets rested 
in part on his data analysis.   
107 See, e.g., Henry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Managerial Ownership of Voting 
Rights: A Study of Public Corporations with Dual Classes of Common Stock, 14 J. FIN. 
ECON. 33 (1985); Ronald C. Lease, John J. McConnell & Wayne H. Mikkelson, The Market 
of Control in Publicly-Traded Corporations, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 439 (1983). 
108 Of the best known is a study by Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii and Andrew Metrick that reports 
a negative relationship between dual class and firm value.   Gompers, et al., supra note 74. 
The study, however, is based on a sample of U.S. firms from 1995 to 2002, prior to the 
Google IPO.  Id.  
109 See, e.g., Fisch & Solomon, supra note 3 at 1073 (describing empirical studies finding 
that dual class forms initially outperform firms with one share/one vote structures but that 
this outperformance dissipates over time). 
110 Id. 
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notwithstanding the firm’s voting structure.  In other words, dual class may be a 
result of the issuer’s high performance rather than the cause of that performance.  
Moreover, the growth in dual class companies has occurred relatively recently, 
posing challenges in empirically assessing its long-term effect.  It may be that 
the studies finding impact of dual class are dependent upon an early crop of 
technology outperformers such as Google.  
 
Thus, the dual class structure like many other governance provisions raises 
issues with what exactly is the right corporate governance for a firm?  Indeed, 
the questions that dual class raises are particularly stark because despite investor 
protests, firms continue to go public with dual class voting structures, and 
investors continue to purchase the stock of dual class firms.   At a minimum, this 
raises the question of whether institutional shareholders actually mean what they 
assert about dual class or whether their objections are cheap talk based on 
theoretical principles about shareholder democracy rather than actual investing 
intent.  This question leads us to one possible solution: investor choice through 
synthetic governance.  
 
III. Synthetic Governance 
 
a. The Rise of Index Investing 
 
 As the debate over governance rages in the corporate world, the role of the 
capital markets in disciplining governance choices has been dramatically 
reformed by the growth and increasing popularity of index funds.  Over the past 
decade, the percentage of assets invested in the U.S. equity markets through 
index funds has doubled – from 7% in 2010 to approximately 14% in 2019.111 
Because a passive investment strategy is less costly than active stock-picking, 
index funds typically charge investors lower fees than actively-managed mutual 
funds.112  The growth in index funds has also led to a concentration in the asset 
management market.113  The big three – BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street 
– collectively manage roughly 80% of the index fund market and, as a result of 
the funds they manage, own roughly 20% of S&P 500 companies.114 
 
 
111 See Dawn Lim, Index Funds Are the New Kings of Wall Street, THE WALL ST. J., Sept. 
18, 2019, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-funds-are-the-new-kings-of-wall-
street-11568799004 
112 See Jill E. Fisch, The Uncertain Stewardship Potential of Index Funds in DIONYSIA 
KATELOUZOU & DAN W. PUCHNIAK EDS, GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER STEWARDSHIP: 
COMPLEXITIES, CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES (Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming), 
available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3525355 (“Because they do not rely on costly 
firm-specific research, index funds incur lower management costs, and they pass these 
reduced costs on to mutual fund investors in the form of very low fees”). 
113 See Fisch, et al., supra note 1 at 26 (Index fund sponsors “enjoy economies of scale 
which enable them to manage very large pools of assets at low cost”).   
114 See Lim, supra note 111. 
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 Although there are thousands of indexes,115 the vast majority of assets are 
invested in funds based on wide-known and broad-based market indexes.  
Adriana Robertson reports that over $1.5 trillion in assets are invested in funds 
that track the S&P 500, and another almost $800 billion are invested in funds 
that track the Russell 2000 index. 116   Together these indexes account for 
approximately half the assets invested in index funds. 
 
 But while most assets are in large, significant funds there are a number of 
bespoke indexes.  In her study, Robertson found that the median index was 
tracked by only a single fund.117  Moreover, she found a total of 193 different 
indexes that were associated with assets exceeding $1 billion.118  These indexes 
are highly divergent including one based on the investing style of T. Boone 
Pickens, another based on investing in the Nashville area as well as more 
traditional ETFs like airline industry and currency ETFs.119 The variety of ETFs 
and the indexes they track highlight that this is a new form of stock-picking 
albeit on a more widespread basis.120 It also illustrates the demand for both 
market-wide indexes and bespoke investment style indexes and ETFs.  
   
b. The Role of Indexes in Governance 
 
 Data is mixed on the effect of the rise in index investing on governance.  At 
a minimum, an index-based investment strategy limits the ability of investors to 
discipline the portfolio companies through trading decisions.  Because index 
funds are compelled to hold the portfolio companies in the underlying index, 
they cannot sell companies on the basis of bad governance or invest more in 
companies with high quality governance.  This has led some commentators to 
express concern that a growth in index investing will undermine the ability of 
the capital markets to discipline corporate governance through stock prices.121  
Two of us have questioned this concern in other work, noting both that active 
investors still dominate the market and that only a relatively small number of 
active traders are necessary for efficient price discovery and market 
efficiency.122  Nonetheless, it is a possibility.  
 
 
115 See Adriana Robertson, Passive in Name Only: Delegated Management and 'Index' 
Investing, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 795 (2019) (reporting 610 distinct indexes). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 813. 
118 Id. at 814. 
119 See Fisch, et al., supra note 1 at 30 n. 65 (describing the BOON ETF).   
120 See generally id. 
121 See, e.g., Vladyslav Sushko & Grant Turner, The implications of passive investing for 
securities Markets, BIS Quarterly Review 113, 121 (March 2018) (“A higher share of 
passive investors could therefore weaken market discipline and alter the incentives of 
corporate and sovereign issuers to act in the interest of investors”). 
122 Id. at 58-59. 
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  In addition, some commentators have argued that index funds lack adequate 
incentives to monitor their portfolio companies by engaging with management 
and exercising their voting power in an informed manner.  They argue that, 
because index funds compete primarily on cost, they have no incentive to engage 
in stewardship.123  As a result, these commentators predict both that index funds 
will underinvest in engagement with their portfolio companies and that their 
voting decisions will be uninformed.  At least one commentator, Dorothy Lund,  
has relied on these propositions to argue that index funds should be prohibited 
from voting the shares they hold.124 
 
 Other scholars argue that index funds have had a positive effect on corporate 
governance.  Ian Appel hypothesizes that index funds are able to use their voting 
power effectively and has developed empirical evidence supporting this 
proposition. 125  He finds that increased ownership by index funds is associated 
with greater board independence, fewer firm antitakeover defenses, higher 
profitability and increased firm value.126 Other scholars have documented the 
leadership position of the large index fund sponsors in advocating certain 
governance reforms such as the removal of staggered boards and poison pills.127  
We have separately written that large index fund sponsors have significant 
incentives to exercise their vote and in general minimize systemic risk.128   
 
Because of the concentration of assets held by the large asset managers, 
institutional index investors have increasing influence on both the operational 
decisions of their portfolio companies and other market participants such as 
index providers, stock exchanges and proxy advisors.  They participate in 
institutional investor organizations in which they increasingly articulate what 
they believe to be best practices for corporate governance and advocate for the 
widespread adoption of those practices.129  Index funds further deploy the “heft” 
of their substantial holdings to vote in favor of shareholder proposals advocating 
governance reforms such as the removal of staggered boards or independent 
 
123 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate 
Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUMBIA L. REV. 2029, 2057 (2019) 
 (“Competition with other mutual funds, index funds give index fund managers precisely 
zero additional incentive to invest in stewardship for any of their portfolio companies.”). 
124 See Lund, supra note 64. 
125 Ian Appel, Research: Index Funds Are Improving Corporate Governance, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (May 9, 2016), available https://hbr.org/2016/05/research-index-funds-are-improving-
corporate-governance 
126 Id.  
127 See Ian R Appel, Todd A Gormley, Donald B Keim, Standing on the Shoulders of 
Giants: The Effect of Passive Investors on Activism, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 2720 (2019). 
128 See Fisch et al., supra note 1 at 37-43. 
129 Id. at 54-55. 
  
2020] Synthetic Governance 125 
 
board leadership.130  Some index funds have extended their attention to address 
issues such as ESG.131 
 
Some index fund sponsors express concern, however, about their limited 
ability to avoid investing in portfolio companies with value-decreasing 
governance structures.132  IPO companies frequently go public with dual class 
voting structures, staggered board and other features that do not comply with so-
called best governance practices.133  When those companies meet the criteria for 
inclusion in an index, an index fund must invest in their shares despite the view 
that the company’s performance would be improved by improvements in its 
governance.  These sponsors have complained vociferously about this, and the 
fact they are being forced to invest in companies who lack the governance 
scheme they desire.134 
 
 
130 Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock explain that index funds, because of the size of their 
shareholdings, bring “heft” to “to a fund family’s actively managed portfolios.” See Marcel 
Kahan & Edward Rock, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let Shareholders be 
Shareholders (2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3295098.  See Press Release, Council of 
Institutional Investors, Institutional Investors Call on IPO Companies to Adopt Equity 
Structures, Governance Provisions that Protect Shareholders (Mar. 23, 2016), 
http://tinyurl.com/cii-ipo-position. 
131 BlackRock’s Larry Fink is perhaps most notably for his public statements urging public 
company CEOs to focus more on ESG issues.  See Larry Fink Letter, 
https://www.blackrock.com/americas-offshore/2019-larry-fink-ceo-letter (explaining that 
“environmental, social, and governance issues will be increasingly material to corporate 
valuations”). See also STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS, PROXY VOTING AND ENGAGEMENT 
GUIDELINES 2 (2019), https://www.ssga.com/our-insights/viewpoints/2019-proxy-voting-
and-engagement-guidelines-north-america.html [https://perma.cc/KK94-CWQD] (reporting 
that SSGA engages “with companies to provide insight on the principles and practices that 
drive our voting decisions. We also conduct proactive engagements to address significant 
shareholder concerns and environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) issues in a 
manner consistent with maximizing shareholder value”).  Notably, despite their public 
statements of support, the large asset managers vote their shares against most ESG-related 
proposals.  Cydney Posner, How do the largest fund families vote on shareholder proposals 
related to ESG?, Cooley PubCo., March 2, 2020, https://cooleypubco.com/2020/03/02/fund-
families-vote-esg-shareholder-proposals/. 
132 Madison Marriage, State Street Asks SEC to Block Non-Voting Shares, FIN. TIMES: FTFM, 
June 19, 2017, at 1. 
133 Blair Nicholas & Brandon Marsh, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, Dual-
Class: The Consequences of Depriving Institutions of Corporate Voting Rights, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 17, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/17/dual-class-the-consequences-of-depriving-
institutional-investors-of-corporate-voting-rights/ [https://perma.cc/AA35-LSRA] 
134 Ning Chiu, BlackRock Wants Equal Voting Rights but Opposes Exclusion from Indexes, 
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One potential solution is to exclude companies with poor corporate 
governance from the standard indices.135  After a controversial debate over 
whether issuers should be allowed to go public with dual or multi-class voting 
structures in which public investors were only able to purchase low vote or no 
vote stock, some market participants called upon index providers to exclude dual 
class issuers from inclusion in the most popular indexes.136  In 2017, two leading 
index providers – Dow Jones and FTSE Russel, which provide the indices 
tracked by the most popular index funds – announced that, on a prospective 
basis, they would no longer include companies with multi-class voting 
structures.137   
 
As Scott Hirst and Kobi Kastiel explain, governance by exclusion is 
potentially problematic for index funds.138  Particularly for the broad-based 
market indices, the exclusion of dual class companies can substantially affect 
the composition of the fund as well as its performance.  Governance by exclusion 
imposes unproven assumptions about the economic impact of particular 
governance terms on those who invest in index funds.  In addition, index fund 
investors who are seeking to invest in the overall market may not even 
understand that, as a result of a decision by the index provider, their portfolio 
does not contain exposure to an important segment of the market.139 On these 
bases, BlackRock opposed the revision of the indexes instead arguing that its 
index funds should still be permitted to invest in these companies but the 
companies themselves should eliminate this structure.140  
 
c. Bespoke Indexes: A New Governance Tool  
 
The challenge of disciplining governance through index investing results 
from limitations in the scope of index funds themselves.  A noted above, the vast 
majority of funds track a few broad-based indices such as the S&P 500.   Index 
 
135 Another option is to exclude such companies from listing their shares on the stock 
exchanges.  In 2018, the Council of Institutional Investors filed petitions with the New York 
Stock Exchange and Nasdaq urging them to limiting the listing of dual class issuers.  See 
Hazel Bradford, Investors intensify fight against dual-class shares, PENSIONS & 
INVESTMENTS, Apr. 1, 2019, 
https://www.pionline.com/article/20190401/PRINT/190409984/investors-intensify-fight-
against-dual-class-shares. 
136 Scott Hirst & Kobi Kastiel, Corporate Governance by Index Exclusion, 99 B.U. L. REV. 
1229 (2019).   
137 Id. at 1232. 
138 Id. 
139 For example, a dual class exclusion would include companies such as Google, Facebook 
and Pinterest.   
140 Ning Chiu, BlackRock Wants Equal Voting Rights but Opposes Exclusion from Indexes, 
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exclusion, at least in the case of dual class stock, focuses on whether to exclude 
companies with a particular governance feature from those standard indices.  But 
the index market, to date, does not appear to have used governance provisions 
as a basis for constructing bespoke indexes.141 
 
There is no obvious reason for this omission.  The major index providers can 
and do construct bespoke indexes at the behest of an asset manager.142  An index 
provider can incorporate any set of rule-based firm selection criteria into an 
index, including governance features.  As a result, it is possible to create an index 
comprised solely of companies with dual class voting structures or to construct 
a dual-free S&P 500 index.  Similarly, it is possible to construct an index that 
extends beyond the exclusion of dual class and that excludes companies with 
other “bad” governance provisions such as a staggered board, a combined 
chairman and CEO, plurality voting, excessive restrictions on shareholder ability 
to call a special meeting, or any other governance feature.   
 
Governance-based index funds thus could provide investors with access to 
synthetic governance, the ability to select their portfolio companies on the basis 
of governance criteria.  The utility of such funds is manifold.  First, they provide 
a solution to the inability of index funds to exercise market discipline by selling 
the stock of companies with bad corporate governance.   Because an asset 
manager can offer a “good governance” fund in which governance is an 
investment criterion, asset flows into that fund will have the effect of reducing 
the cost of capital for the fund’s portfolio companies.  Second, governance funds 
offer a market-based mechanism to evaluate empirically the effect of corporate 
governance.  If, as many large institutional investors claim, certain bad 
 
141 We note there have been limited efforts to exploit corporate governance as a trading 
strategy outside the ESG context.  Perhaps the best known is the Lens fund, which used a 
long/short strategy to exploit differences in corporate governance.  An example of an 
actively-managed fund that explicitly discloses its consideration of governance is the 
Neuberger Berman Intrinsic Value Funds. See, e.g., Neuberger Berman Intrinsic Value Fund 
Summary Prospectus A C and Institutional, at 2-3 (Dec. 13, 2019) 
https://www.nb.com/handlers/documents.ashx?item_id=c9b99343-2112-42cf-9a17-
9ad85ba01522 (“The Portfolio Managers also integrate governance factors into the 
investment process. They seek to invest in companies that have effective and independent 
boards composed of diverse, and currently active, CEOs and other C-level executives. They 
look for companies where management and shareholder interests are aligned (often through 
high ownership of the company by management), with long-term incentive plans and CEO 
and management compensation and succession plans in place.”). We note that an index-
based approach offers several advantages including a more transparent set of governance 
criteria as well as the substantially lower costs associated with an index-based investment 
vehicle.  See, e.g., supra note 48 (noting the potential costs associating with operating a 
hedge fund to exploit a governance-based investment strategy). 
142 See Robertson, supra note at 115. 
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governance features are value-decreasing, good governance funds should 
outperform their broad-based peers and attract inflows from investors.143  
 
 Finally, synthetic governance provides a mechanism to enhance management 
accountability by providing passive investors a mechanism by which to subject 
the governance choices of their portfolio companies to capital market discipline. 
There are also systemic effects – if bespoke governance indexes are successful 
in attracting investor assets, firms may adopt specific governance practices to 
qualify for inclusion. To be sure, this may dilute the performance of these 
indexes are attributable to firm characteristics which are not a product of the 
governance mechanism but a feature.  We take up this issue further in the next 
section, but the answer to this issue in that case is the development of a new 
index.  In other words capital will dictate which  governance mechanisms are 
the most valuable, on average.  
 
Although ESG investing differs to a degree from a governance-based 
investing strategy, the rise of ESG index funds provides an analogous illustration 
of the practicality of the index-based concept.  ESG-based investing is one of 
fastest growing investment categories.144  Large asset managers are offering 
investors an inceasing number of index fund products that track various ESG 
indices such as the MSCI ESG indices, the Dow Jones Sustainability indices, or 
are based on indexes constructed from ESG ratings such as Sustainalytics.145  In 
each case, the fund uses an index constructed on the basis of ESG criteria as the 
basis for its investments.  For example, Dow Jones offers an S&P 500 ESG fund 
that excludes those companies in each industry group that have the lowest ESG 
scores based on the S&P DJI ESG scores as well as companies that make 




143 Mutual fund asset flows respond to fund performance.  See, e.g., Jonathan B. Berk & 
Jules H. van Binsbergen, Mutual Funds in Equilibrium, 9 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 147, 148 
(2017) (“[F]und flows into mutual funds are known to be highly predictable on the basis of 
past performance . . . .”); C. Wei Li, Ashish Tiwari & Lin Tong, Investment Decisions 
Under Ambiguity: Evidence from Mutual Fund Investor Behavior, 63 MGMT. SCI. 2509, 
2523 (2017) (“One of the most well-known findings in the mutual fund literature is the 
convex relationship between investor flows and past fund performance”). 
144 See, e.g., Greg Iacurci Money moving into environmental funds shatters previous record, 
CNBC.com, Jan. 14, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/14/esg-funds-see-record-
inflows-in-2019.html (describing record inflows into ESG mutual funds in 2019). 
145 See, e.g., Jess Liu, Morningstar’s Quintessential List of Sustainable Funds, Apr. 20, 
2020, https://www.morningstar.com/articles/977271/morningstars-quintessential-list-of-
sustainable-funds (describing various categories of ESG mutual funds). 
146 Reid Steadman & Daniel Perrone, S&P Dow Jones Indices, The S&P 500® ESG Index: 
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 Investors can thus use index funds to select or exclude portfolio companies 
based on ESG criteria.  In other words, ESG can function as a postive screen – 
whereby an index will include portfolio companies that meet designated ESG 
criteria – or as a negative screen in which companies with certain characteristis 
are excluded from the index.  As funds based on these indexes develop a track 
record, their performance will provide valuable information on the relationship 
beween ESG and economic performance.  ESG indexes can implement broad-
based screens or those that are hyper-specific. The SPDR SSGA Gender 
Diversity Index ranks companies within each sector by three gender diversity 
ratios and focuses “on companies with the highest levels within their sectors of 
senior leadership gender diversity.”147  The related ETF had $117 million in 
assets under management as of June 26, 2020 and its three top holdings were 
Paypal, Visa, and Home Depot.148 For the year to date (through July 1) the ETF 
has returned -7.78% compared to -3.52% for the S&P 500 Index.  
 
d. Synthetic Governance in Action 
 
Given the range of indexes and related ETFs, it is apparent that there is 
demand and a market structure to support the use of bespoke indexes to 
implement synthetic governance. Mutual funds structured in accordance with 
these indexes would allow investors to select for their preferred governance 
characteristics.  
 
We theorize that fund flows into governance mutual funds would be based on 
the characteristics that drive fund flows elsewhere -- mainly excess return.  In 
this regard we do not view a governance index as a sector index likely to generate 
idiosyncratic or undiversified performance.  A governance index would instead 
operate as a general market index akin to the S&P 500 or Russell 3000 but keyed 
to governance characteristics. In this regard, the benchmark for such an index 
would be these wider, market indexes.149   
 
The development of governance indexes would allow investors to address the 
selection and endogeneity problems of empirical studies. Instead, a firm’s 
governance provisions would be evaluated by reference to the performance of 
the governance fund relative to the broader market (or, in some cases, the 
relevant sector).  Governance indexes would simply let investors include or 
exclude companies based on specific or multiple governance provisions.  In this 
regard, synthetic governance is no different than any index – it implements a 
 
147 State Street Global Advisors, SPDR® SSGA Gender Diversity Index ETF, 
https://www.ssga.com/us/en/individual/etfs/funds/spdr-ssga-gender-diversity-index-etf-she 
(last visited June 29, 2020). 
148 Id. 
149 We note that this proposition would not hold to the extent that particular governance 
provisions are disproportionately associated with a particular industry sector.  See infra note 
[] (discussing this concern in connection with dual class stock). 
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rule-based approach to stock selection with specific governance provisions 
constituting the applicable rules. By providing a simple and low-cost investment 
strategy based on governance provisions, synthetic governance will allow 
capital flows to select which governance features are value increasing.  As such, 
synthetic governance is a market-based alternative to regulation, a tool for 
enhancing the market discipline of firm-specific governance choices.   
 
Moreover, two of us have theorized that governance and voice in index funds 
can ameliorate systemic risk issues.150   To the extent this theory is true, a 
bespoke governance ETF may also draw capital looking to hedge against 
systemic risks that specific governance provisions address.  It may therefore be 
that these types of indexes attract capital even if they lag the S&P 500 or other 
major indexes .   
 
 In the next section we illustrate the use of synthetic governance through the 
construction of an index predicated on dual class voting structures: the Dual 
Index. 
 
IV.  The Dual Index 
 
The Dual Index is a bespoke index of dual-class companies conceived and 
developed by one of the co-authors of this paper.151 The objective of the Dual 
Index is to target those dual-class companies in which, according to the existing 
empirical literature, the net benefits of the dual-class structure are most likely to 
be positive. It does so in two steps: first, by selecting dual class companies and 
second, by creating a synthetic time-based sunset provision to exclude stocks 
that retain a dual class structure a designated number of years after the 
company’s IPO.  The Dual Index thus provides a model of how to create a 
customized governance regime through synthetic governance. 
 
In the following sections, we provide the details of the Dual Index 
construction and report our tests of its performance. 
 
A. Dual Index Construction 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the rise to prominence of dual-class companies over the 
last decade. The total market value of dual-class companies has increased by 
five times: from $700 billion in June 2009 to $3.8 trillion in December 2019. As 
of the most recent index reconstitution, the value of dual-class companies 
 
150 Fisch et al., supra note 1, at 25-26. 
151 A version of the Dual Index is licensed to an ETF issuer under the name North Shore 
Dual Share Class ETF (the “Fund”). The Fund seeks to provide investment results that, 
before fees and expenses, correspond generally to the total return performance of the North 
Shore Dual Share Class Index (the “Index”). 
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To develop the Dual Index, we follow a biannual reconstitution process. 
Semiannually, at the end of June and December of each year, we compile a list 
of dual-class companies with ordinary common shares listed on NYSE, 
NASDAQ, or AMEX and total market capitalization in excess of $100 million. 
 
From this subset, we initially select for inclusion those dual-class companies 
whose firm age as a public company (the time elapsed since their IPO) ranges 
from six months to twenty years. Since most IPOs have six-month lockups that 
can influence both price and volatility,152 our portfolio excludes IPOs prior to 
the expiration of that lockup. The twenty-year filter effectively retains all 
companies that went public after the Google IPO in 2004.153  As a result, the 
Dual Index effectively eliminates the prior generation of dual class companies – 
the family owned and media companies that are the focus of some earlier 
empirical studies of dual class stock. The twenty-year filter is sufficiently long 
that it does not impose a synthetic sunset – an issue that we address later; instead, 
a twenty-year window is of sufficient length that it addresses the issues two of 
us raised in the Problem of Sunsets, namely that a time horizon is arbitrary and 
 
152 See, e.g. James C. Brau, David A. Carter, Stephen E. Christophe & Kimberly G. Key, 
Market Reaction to the Expiration of IPO Lockup Provisions, 30 MGMT. FIN. 75 (2003) 
(reporting statistically significant negative abnormal returns in the event window 
surrounding the expiration date of the lockup). 
153 See Lucinda Shen, If You Bought Google at Its IPO Price, Here’s How Much Richer 
You’d Be, FORTUNE, Aug. 18, 2017, https://fortune.com/2017/08/18/google-ipo-price-
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appears contrary to the purpose of a sunset which is to end dual class when it is 
no longer useful to implement the founder’s visionary mission.154   
 
In case of a delisting or collapse of the dual-class structure, we reinvest the 
proceeds in the market portfolio until the next Dual Index reconstitution. Our 
back-testing period is from June 2009 to December 2019, which is the most 
recent date on which we reconstituted the Dual Index. 
 
B. Dual Index Characteristics 
 
As of December of 2019, the Dual Index included 178 dual-class companies 
valued at $3.4 trillion.  The Index includes for 89% of the market capitalization 
of all dual-class companies listed across major U.S. stock exchanges. 
 
With respect to the distribution of index weights across sectors, Table 1 shows 
that as of December 2019, the most heavily weighted sectors are Communication 
Services (38.8%) and Information Technology (33.7%) followed by Financials 
(9.4%), Consumer Discretionary (4.9%), and Health Care (4.4%). Focusing on 
these sectors, the top portfolio holdings include, Facebook (Communication 
Services), Visa (Information Technology), CME Group (Financials), Lululemon 
Athletica (Consumer Discretionary), and Zoetis (Health Care).   
 
Table 1 also demonstrates how the sector representation within the Dual Index 
has evolved over time.  In particular, the prominence of dual-class companies in 
the Communication Services and Information Technology sector has increased, 
and the relative index weights of dual-class companies in the Industrials sector 
has declined. 
 
Table 1: Dual Index Sector Weights 
GICS Sector June 2009 December 2019 Average 
Communication Services 23.4% 38.8% 29.2% 
Information Technology 20.9% 33.7% 26.1% 
Financials 15.8% 9.4% 13.4% 
Consumer Discretionary 8.1% 4.9% 6.8% 
Health Care 5.8% 4.4% 3.8% 
Consumer Staples 9.2% 3.5% 7.9% 
Industrials 13.5% 2.7% 10.1% 
Real Estate 0.8% 0.9% 1.0% 
Energy 0.8% 0.8% 0.5% 
Materials 1.8% 0.7% 1.2% 
 
154 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 3, at 1080. 
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Utilities 0.0% 0.3% 0.1% 
 
Table 2 compares the Dual Index constituents to the general population of 
companies along several dimensions of corporate governance. The evidence 
shows that the dual-class structure overlaps with other provisions that may 
inhibit management accountability to shareholders and increase agency costs – 
that is, other provisions typically characterized as “bad” governance. To 
illustrate, dual class companies are significantly less likely to separate the CEO 
and board chair positions. The percentage of dual-class companies with 
combined CEO-chair roles is 42% compared to 32% for the general population. 
Dual-class companies are less likely to require majority vote to elect their board 
(26% vs. 42%). Dual-class companies are also slightly less likely to have a 
majority of independent board directors (83% vs. 88%) and less likely to have a 
majority voting director resignation policy (30% vs. 48%).155  
 
With respect to other corporate governance dimensions, dual-class companies 
are less likely to have a poison pill policy (1% vs. 3%) in which the company 
needs to obtain stockholder approval before adopting a poison pill  and are less 
likely to require supermajority voting for mergers (7% vs. 17%). This last 
provision makes it difficult for an acquirer to achieve the affirmative vote of 
enough shareholders to approve a merger transaction or even impossible if 
insiders hold enough shares to prevent the acquirer from obtaining the required 
vote. Lastly, dual-class companies are less likely to provide shareholders with 
the power to call a special meeting (39% vs. 46%). 
 







I(Dual CEO Chair) 42% 32% 10%*** 
I(Majority Vote to Elect Board) 26% 42% -16%*** 
I(Majority Board Being Independent) 83% 88% -5%* 
I(Director Resignation Policy) 30% 48% -18%*** 
I(Poison Pill Policy) 1% 3% -2%*** 
I(Supermajority Vote Merger) 7% 17% -10%*** 
I(Shareholders Special Meeting Rights) 39% 46% -7%** 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
 
 
155 The director resignation policy requires any director who receives more withheld than 
votes for their election to tender his or her resignation to the board. The board will then 
decide whether it will accept the resignation. See Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel 
Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1126 (2016) (explaining director resignation policies). 
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C. Back-Testing Results 
 
Next, we evaluate the historical track record of the Dual Index. Table 3 
presents the results over the 126 months from June 2009 to December 2019. We 
construct the value-weighted market index including distributions using the 
CRSP universe of common stocks.  
 
Over the back-testing period, the Dual Index earned an annual return of 
19.23% with standard deviation of 14.39%, while the CRSP market index earned 
an annual return of 14.98% with standard deviation of 12.98%. The Dual Index 
performance corresponds to a monthly multi-factor alpha of 31 basis points. In 
terms of factor loadings, the Dual Index has (a) positive loadings on the market 
and momentum factors, (b) negative loadings on the size and investment factors, 
and (c) insignificant loadings on the value and profitability factors. 
 
Table 3: Dual Index Performance (June 2009 to December 2019) 








Monthly Return 1.60% 1.25% 1.23% 1.32% 
Monthly Volatility 4.15% 3.75% 3.75% 3.78% 
Annual Return 19.23% 14.98% 14.72% 15.89% 
Annual Volatility 14.39% 12.98% 12.99% 13.10% 
Cum. Growth of $1 $6.68 $4.38 $4.26 $4.81 
 
 Table 3 also compares the Dual Index to two other benchmarks.  First, in the 
third column, it compares the Dual Index to the market with dual-class 
companies excluded.  The third column thus demonstrates the economic impact 
of excluding dual class in accordance with the approach recently adopted by 
some index providers.  As the column indicates, excluding dual class has little 
effect on performance relative to the market as a whole. 
 
 Second, in response to the fact that dual class voting structures are 
concentrated in the technology sector, and to isolate the sectoral component of 
the Dual index, we construct a portfolio of non-dual-class companies with 
identical sector weights to those of the Dual Index. In essence, the mimicking 
index (“Mimic Index”) replicates the sectoral exposure of the Dual Index using 
non-dual-class companies.  This index thus addresses concerns that the results 
of the Dual Index are driven solely by out-performance of technology firms.  
 
 Table 3 shows that over the back-testing period the Mimic Index earned an 
annual return of 15.89% with standard deviation of 13.10%, while the Dual 
Index earned an annual return of 19.23% with standard deviation of 14.39%. 
Figure 2 also shows that a one-dollar investment in the Mimic Index would have 
grown to $4.81 between June 2009 and December 2019.  Over the same time, a 
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one-dollar investment in the Dual Index would have grown to $6.68. While the 
Mimic Index outperforms the market index over the back-testing period, it does 
not fully account for the outperformance of the Dual Index. Stated otherwise, 
the performance of the Dual Index does not simply capture the sectoral 
performance of dual-class constituents.  One implication is that there is a firm-
specific component to the dual-class share structure choice that goes beyond 
sectoral variation. 
 
 Figure 2 plots the cumulative growth of a one-dollar investment in the Dual 
Index (green line) relative to the cumulative growth of a one-dollar investment 
in the market index (blue line).  The evidence shows that a one-dollar investment 
in the Dual Index would have grown to $6.68 between June 2009 and December 
2019.  Over the same time, a one-dollar investment in the market index would 
have grown to $4.38. Figure 2 also shows that the performance of the Dual Index 
is especially pronounced in the second half of our back-testing period, which is 
consistent with the rise in prominence of dual-class companies. 
 
 We note that the spread in the realized performance of the Dual Index relative 
to the overall market portfolio may understate the outperformance of dual-class 
companies. This is because the overall market index performance, especially 
over the last decade, is partially attributed to the rise of dual-class companies. 
Going forward, major indices will either exclude or underweight dual-class 
companies. As a result, index investors will no longer be able to effortlessly 
access the growth of these companies through their index holdings.  Indeed, over 
the back-testing period a one-dollar investment in the market index excluding 
Dual stocks would have grown to $4.26, which is slightly below the performance 
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D. The Effect of Sunset Lengths 
 
 The Dual Index does not merely enable us to capture the effect of an 
investment strategy based on whether a firm utilizes a dual-class voting 
structure, it allows us to go further and test the effect of a time-based sunset.  We 
do this by shortening the length of time a company remains in our index 
following its IPO.  By excluding dual-class companies a designated number of 
years after the IPO we are, in effect, creating a synthetic sunset. 
 
 Part of the value of this approach is that it sheds light on the time period that 
is necessary to allow the founders to fulfill their idiosyncratic vision.  To explore 
this question, we test the performance of the Dual Index using alternative sunset 
provisions ranging from five to twenty years. 
 
 Table 4 reports the back-testing results and reveals that the performance of 
the Dual Index is higher for shorter sunset windows but at the expense of higher 
return volatilities and portfolio turnover. Indeed, the Sharpe ratio, that is, the 
ratio of average excess returns divided by the standard deviation of the excess 
return on each bespoke portfolio, is relatively flat across the different sunset 
windows. It follows that per unit of volatility the performance of the Dual Index 
is similar regardless of the length of the synthetic sunset. 
 
Table 4: Dual Index Performance (June 2009 to December 2019) 
Sunset Length: 20 years 15 years 10 years 5 years 
Monthly Return 1.60% 1.71% 1.67% 2.11% 
Monthly Volatility 4.15% 4.32% 4.85% 5.35% 
Annual Return 19.23% 20.47% 20.01% 25.38% 
Annual Volatility 14.39% 14.95% 16.82% 18.54% 
Cum. Growth of $1 $6.68 $7.53 $6.97 $11.74 
Portfolio Turnover 5.7% 6.6% 6.6% 12.8% 
 
 Whereas we do not firmly advocate for a particular sunset window, our 
evidence illustrates the range of possibilities in the design of synthetic 
governance portfolios.  Nonetheless, our findings illustrate early stage dual-class 
companies appear both to generate higher returns for investors but at the cost of 
causing them to bear additional risk.  The variation in table 4 indicates the 
potential value of multiple Dual Class indexes using a variety of artificial sunsets 
which reflect the risk preferences of investors.  Again, we view this as an 
advantage of synthetic governance, allowing investors to select into their 
preferred governance preferences. To be clear, our evidence does not directly 
speak to the value of the alternative sunset lengths. Nevertheless, our evidence 
  
2020] Synthetic Governance 137 
 
demonstrates that the dual class structure may be most valuable in the first few 
years post-IPO. 
 
 One significant question about the Dual Index is the extent to which it can 
accurately be described as evaluating the economic effect of a governance 
provision.  Particularly as applied to the recently-IPO’d technology companies, 
dual class voting structures may not be the cause of excess returns but instead 
the consequence.  That is, companies that investors expect to outperform may, 
at the IPO stage, be able to go public with governance structures that investors 
would not otherwise tolerate.  The fact that those companies subsequently 
perform well does not provide evidence on the counterfactual question of 
whether they would have performed even better with a one share/one vote 
structure.   At the same time, we note that a declining percentage of companies 
are choosing to access the public capital markets at all, and the availability of 
governance provisions that increase founder insulation may be one tool that 
increases the founder’s willingness to allow public investors to share in the 
company’s growth.  If governance provisions that provide founder insulation are 
a necessary tool to induce unicorns and the like to enter the public markets, the 
Dual Index provides evidence that public investors are better off with such 
companies than without them.   
 
V. The Split Index 
 
 The Dual Index is but one example of synthetic governance.  It is possible to 
create indexes based on other governance characteristics.  For example, an 
independent director index could be used to invest only in companies with a 
specified proportion of independent directors.  A staggered board index could 
be used to invest only in companies with (or without) a staggered board.156   
 
 To illustrate further the potential of synthetic governance we create a Split 
index which consists of companies that split the positions of CEO and Chairman 
of the board.  Institutional investors increasingly cite the separation of these 
positions as an important measure of good corporate governance. 157   The 
 
156 Such an index would be particularly useful in generating evidence for what appears to be 
a never-ending debate about the economic impact of staggered boards.  Compare Alma 
Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 627 (2013) (presenting empirical 
evidence that staggered boards lead to lower firm value) Cremers, et al., supra note 57 
(presenting evidence that, in some firms, staggered boards increase firm value) and Amihud, 
et al., supra note 9 (finding that a staggered board has no significant impact on firm value) 
157 See, e.g., Council of Institutional Investors, Independent Board Leadership, 
https://www.cii.org/independent_board (last visited June 29, 2020) (“A CEO who also 
serves as chair can exert excessive influence on the board and its agenda, weakening the 
board’s oversight of management. Separating the chair and CEO positions reduces this 
conflict, and an independent chair provides the clearest separation of power between the 
CEO and the rest of the board.”). 
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theoretical idea behind this split is that it will cause a board to have more 
oversight over the CEO and thereby make economically improved decisions.158  
But, as with dual class, the positive economic effect of splitting the two positions 
has yet to be established. 
 
 We create the split index by obtaining annual CEO-Chairman duality data 
from the ExecuComp and identify the role of chairman of the board by keyword 
detection in CEO's yearly title. Specifically, the keywords include "chairman" 
and "chmn", and exclude "vice chairman" and "vice-chairman."  We then create 
an index of companies that meet this criteria.   
 
Table 5: Split Index Performance (June 2009 to December 2019) 
 Split Index Market Index 
Monthly Return 1.31% 1.25% 
Monthly Volatility 3.87% 3.75% 
Annual Return 15.73% 14.98% 
Annual Volatility 13.41% 12.98% 
Cum. Growth of $1 $4.70 $4.38 
 
 The back-testing results in Table 5 show that the Split Index outperforms the 
CRSP market benchmark by 75 basis points per annum.  A one-dollar 
investment in the Split Index would have grown to $4.70 between June 2009 and 
December 2019. Over the same time, a one-dollar investment in the market 
index would have grown to $4.38. 
 
 The findings thus also highlight that other indexes comprised of corporate 
governance measures can also earn excess returns above a benchmark.  In 
addition, the Split Index partially addresses the endogeneity problem that we 
identified with respect to the Dual Index. Because an issuer is not typically 
locked into a split Chair and CEO through a charter provision, mid-stream 
changes between combined and split positions are a regular occurrence, an 
existing CEO rarely has the power to preclude the shareholders or the board from 
splitting the two positions, and an issuer cannot extract investor acquiescence in 
a combined structure as the price of investing in the company.159 
 
 To be sure, issuers may respond to the growth of synthetic governance by 
modifying their governance features to qualify for inclusion.  This may have an 
 
158 See id. (“Having an independent chair helps the board carry out its primary duty—to 
monitor the management of the company on behalf of its shareowners”). 
159 See, e.g., Brian Patrick Eha, Will Wells' chairman-CEO split force other banks' hands?  
AMERICAN BANKER, Jan. 10, 2017, https://www.americanbanker.com/news/will-wells-
chairman-ceo-split-force-other-banks-hands (describing Wells Fargo’s decision to adopt a 
bylaw splitting the roles of CEO and Chair after the fake accounts scandal). 
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effect on future returns. Notably, however, this response would demonstrate the 
potential disciplinary power associated with enabling investors to choose an 
index strategy based on governance.  To the extent that a governance index 
generates superior returns and investor assets respond by flowing into the index, 
if issuers adopt the index’s governance provisions, the capital market forces are 




 Although the rise of intermediated investing has generated extensive 
criticism, it offers a new mechanism for exercising market discipline.  Mutual 
funds already offer investors the opportunity to invest in a passive fund that 
replicates the performance of a broad-based market index or to focus on ESG 
criteria in their investment decisions.  The returns of these funds provide 
empirical evidence on the relative economic performance of their investment 
strategies. 
 
 We demonstrate that the potential of mutual funds extends further and 
provides a tool to evaluate corporate governance practices.  Constructing a 
bespoke index that selects or excludes portfolio companies based on governance 
criteria allows investors to opt into or out of governance structures while 
retaining the benefits of a low-cost passive investment strategy.  To the extent 
that investor concerns over particular governance features are well-founded, the 
return of governance funds enables fund flows to function as a form of synthetic 
governance.  Synthetic governance thus creates a neutral arbiter of governance 
that can dictate preferred provisions through capital allocation. 
 
 We illustrate the potential of synthetic governance by creating and evaluating 
an example - the Dual Index.  The Dual Index confirms that synthetic 
governance is a viable and discrete possibility.  It shows that, at least on a 
historical basis, a synthetic index of dual class stock outperforms applicable 
benchmarks.  While this outperformance might be attributable to selection 
effects or the enhanced protection dual class provides to a founder’s 
idiosyncratic vision, either way, investors benefit from the option to invest in the 
Dual Index.  We also create a number of alternative indexes with synthetic 
sunsets that highlight the value creation of dual class shares in the years closer 
to the IPO date, and provide evidence of the potential value of a dual-class 
sunset.  We create a second governance index – the Split Index – to explore 
further the possible value of synthetic governance to provide market-based 
investmetn options that have the potential to generate excess returnsWhile 
synthetic governance is unlikely to end the debate which corporate governance 
provisions enhance firm value, it offers a practical market-based response as an 
alternative to broad-based regulatory reforms.  We thus offer a path forward to 
resolve what has previously been a logjam in the debates over the efficacy of 
corporate governance.  
